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FEDERALISM, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND JUDICIAL
ENGAGEMENT
Kurt T. Lash*
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or di s-
parage others retained by the people.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX (1791)
When the people have formed a Constitution, they retain those rights which they have not
expressly delegated.
James Madison (1794)1
It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several State Legislatures retain all the
powers of legislation, delegated to them by the State Constitutions; which are not EXPRESSLY
taken away by the Constitution of the United States.
Justice Samuel Chase, Calder v. Bull (1798)2
The sum of [the Ninth and Tenth Amendments] appears to be, that the powers delegated to
the federal government, are, in all cases, to receive the most strict construction that the in-
strument will bear, where the rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individ-
ually, may be drawn in question.
St. George Tucker, View ofthe Constitution of the United States (1803)3
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary "rights talk" under the American Constitution tends to
focus on individual rights or those rights that can be perfected in the case of
a single individual.' This would include, for example, the rights to free ex-
pression, free exercise of religion, sexual autonomy, or the right to equal
treatment. Under the broad umbrella of individual-rights talk, theoretical
discussions generally involve whether courts ought to recognize a particular
Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of James Madison).
2 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798).
3 St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 91, 105 (Liberty Fund 1999) (1803).
4 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 47-75 (1991).
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individual right' or what level of scrutiny (or engagement) ought to apply to
judicially identified individual rights.'
From the beginning of our history as a nation, however, the concept of
legally cognizable rights has included far more than just individual rights.
At the time of the founding, legal and political commentators viewed the
liberties of the people as including individual, majoritarian, and collective
rights.' The cry of "no taxation without representation,"' for example, is a
demand for the right of majoritarian political representation. The revolu-
tionary "Right of the People to alter or to abolish" an oppressive govern-
ment, as announced in the Declaration of Independence,' is a collective
right that can only be perfected as part of a broad cultural movement.
All of the rights mentioned above are held by individual citizens. But
where a single individual may exercise an individual right, majoritarian and
collective rights are participatory; they can be successfully exercised only
as part of a larger group effort of which the individual is but a member.o In
the case of democratic elections and legal revolutions, the individual partic-
ipates with others in the exercise of majoritarian and collective rights, both
involving the exercise of rights appertaining to idea of self government. Our
Constitution enshrines these majoritarian and collective rights of self gov-
ernment in a variety of ways, from the procedures by which majorities elect
members of the political branches of government," to the manner by which
the Constitution itself may be "altered or abolished." 2
Despite their historical pedigree, the majoritarian and collective rights
of self government tend to remain on the sidelines in discussions of judi-
cially cognizable rights and liberties. In fact, some scholars question wheth-
er such rights are judicially cognizable at all. For example, the Supreme
Court has shied away from playing any significant role in determining the
5 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 21, 31-32.
6 See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REv. 683, 689-92
(2007).
7 For a discussion of these various rights and the implications for a proper interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment, see Kurt T. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 895 (2008).
8 See JOURNAL OF THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS, reprinted in C. A. WESLAGER, THE STAMP ACT
CONGRESS 181, 200-01 (Univ. of Del. Press 1976) (1765) (preamble, third, and eighth resolutions).
9 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
10 Individual rights may also shade into participatory rights, as where the right to free expression
is viewed as including rights of group association, see Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
647-49 (2000) and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 579-81 (1995), and where the right to free exercise of religion is viewed as including rights of
church or religious associational autonomy. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705-07 (2012).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XII; id. amend. XVII.
12 See id art. V.
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validity of congressionally accepted amendments to the Constitution."
More controversially, the Supreme Court has, at times, suggested that the
rights of local self government (so-called "state rights") recognized by the
Tenth Amendment are not subject to judicial enforcement but are, instead,
adequately protected through the ordinary structural mechanisms of the
political process. 4 Such an approach seems to contradict longstanding judi-
cial proclamations that the purpose of having a Bill of Rights in the first
place "was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."" Indeed,
placing the retained rights of local self government beyond the reach of
judicial enforcement suggests that such rights have little, if anything, to do
with American constitutional liberty.
More recent decisions by the Supreme Court suggest a more protec-
tive, or more judicially engaged, approach to the rights to local self gov-
ernment.' 6 In Bond v. United States," for example, Justice Kennedy pointed
out that
The federal system rests on what might at first seem a counterintuitive insight, that "freedom
is enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one." The Framers concluded that allo-
cation of powers between the National Government and the States enhances freedom, first by
protecting the integrity of the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people,
from whom all governmental powers are derived.'
According to Kennedy, "[fjederalism is more than an exercise in set-
ting the boundary between different institutions of government for their
own integrity. . . . '[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive
from the diffusion of sovereign power."' 9 Finally, just to drive home the
13 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939) ("[T]he efficacy of [constitutional amend-
ment] ratifications by state legislatures . . . should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the
political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the
promulgation ofthe adoption ofthe amendment.").
14 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-54 (1985).
15W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
16 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) ("We accordingly reject the argu-
ment that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997) (find-
ing federal legislation imposing an obligation on local law enforcement officers "to perform background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers" to be unconstitutional); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567 (1995) ("The possession ofa gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that
might ... substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 188 (1992) ("Whatever the outer limits of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The Fed-
eral Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.").
17 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
18 Id. at 2364 (citation omitted) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999)).
19 Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 181).
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link between local self government and national liberty, Kennedy declared,
"[b]y denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the con-
cerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from
arbitrary power. When government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that
liberty is at stake."20 Kennedy's entire opinion, in fact, is a paean to federal-
ism as an individual right.
Despite Justice Kennedy's strong stand on the individual right to di-
vided government, Bond itself lies in tension with other recent decisions by
the Supreme Court that take a broadly deferential approach to congressional
regulation of matters traditionally regulated by the states.2 Indeed, the cur-
rent Supreme Court seems unsure whether they should be engaged in any
significant way in the enforcement of a line between matters local and mat-
ters national.22 In other words, the Court seems unsure whether federalism
is simply a good idea that Congress ought to respect, or whether federalism
is in fact a constitutional right of the people that Congress must respect.
Only the latter calls for an engaged Court imposing the same justificatory
burdens on Congress when its action abridge the people's right to local self
government as they do when congressional action abridges individual rights
such as those protecting freedom of speech.
To the extent that the Court cares about the original understanding of
the Constitution, there is good reason to follow Justice Kennedy's sugges-
tion in Bond and treat federalism as not just a good idea, but as a constitu-
tional and judicially enforceable right. This Essay explores how federalism
became a textually identified right of the people through the adoption of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Founders understood that the judiciary
would enforce the people's retained right to local self government along
with every other right listed in the first eight amendments. Having estab-
lished the historical roots of federalism as a judicially enforceable individu-
al right, the Essay concludes by explaining how these rights survived the
adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments and remain proper subjects of
judicial engagement to this day.
20 Id
21 See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (upholding a federal civil-
commitment statute authorizing extended detainment of "mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal pris-
oner[s]"); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-33 (2005) (upholding federal regulation of marijuana use
"for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22 This uncertainty is reflected in the shift from the early pro-federalism decisions of the
Rehnquist Court, such as Lopez and New York, and those decisions handed down in the waning days of
the Rehnquist Court, such as Raich. Nor does the Roberts Court seem altogether sure whether its ap-
proach will be one of engagement (as in Bond) or deference (as in Comstock).
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I. FEDERALISM AS A RIGHT UNDER THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION
When James Madison stood before the House of Representatives in
1791 and declared that the Framers never intended to grant federal power to
incorporate a bank,23 he knew what he was talking about. In the latter days
of the Philadelphia Convention, Madison himself had proposed granting
Congress such power, only to rebuffed by his fellows, who acknowledged
that the Constitution did not grant such power but who also insisted that
granting the federal government such power was neither necessary nor
proper.24
Despite his inside knowledge about what transpired at the Convention,
Madison did not rest his opposition to the Bank on the Framers' intentions.
Instead, Madison pointed to the recent ratifying conventions in the states,
which adopted the Constitution with an understanding that national power
would be narrowly construed in order to avoid interfering with the retained
rights of the people in the several states.25 According to Madison, the origi-
nal objection to a Bill of Rights involved a fear that Congress would "ex-
tend[]" federal power "by remote implications."26 State conventions had
been assured that the Necessary and Proper Clause would not be interpreted
to give "additional powers to those enumerated."27 Madison "read sundry
passages from the debates" of the state conventions in which "the constitu-
tion had been vindicated by its principal advocates, against a dangerous
latitude of its powers, charged on it by its opponents."28 He also reminded
the assembly about the proposals the state conventions had submitted,
which sought to prevent overly broad constructions of federal power: "The
explanatory declarations and amendments accompanying the ratifications of
the several states formed a striking evidence, wearing the same complexion.
He referred those who might doubt on the subject, to the several acts of
ratification."29 In sum, Madison was insisting that the broad interpretation
of federal power put forward to justify the incorporation of the bank contra-
dicted the principle of limited enumerated power reflected in the text and
promised to the state conventions.
23 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944-52 (1791).
24 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615-16 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911). For a discussion of the convention debate over the incorporation power, see Kurt T. Lash, "Reso-
lution VI": National Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems Under Article I, Section 8, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin
?abstract id-1894737.
25 James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), reprinted in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 480, 489 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
26 Id. at 488.
27 Id. at 489.
28 Id.
29 id.
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Some of Madison's colleagues objected to the nature of his claims. It
would be one thing, they said, to argue that it was unnecessary to charter a
Bank of the States, or even to warn of potential problems that might arise
with the creation of the Bank.30 But these were questions of "expediency" or
policy, with which men of good faith could disagree.3' Madison, however,
was not making a mere policy argument; he was insisting that the choice to
charter banks was a matter retained by the states as a matter of right.32 Sure-
ly, his colleagues objected, this went too far?
Not to Madison. The man who played a key role in the shaping and
ratification of the Constitution knew the underlying principle of the docu-
ment was one of delegated power-and powers are not delegated from the
ether. They had been delegated from the sovereign people in the several
states who, as a matter of right, retained all powers not given away. Nor
was this merely a matter of unstated principle: even as he spoke, amend-
ments that would textually declare the principle of federalism as a retained
right of the people were wending their way through the state ratification
process." In case his colleagues had forgotten the condition upon which
most states had ratified the Constitution, Madison reminded the House
members that they themselves had drafted a Bill of Rights in order to make
good on promises made during the ratification debates. Here, Madison
pointed specifically to what would become our Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at least, would be good au-
thority with [the amendments suggested by the state conventions]; all these renunciations of
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now contended for. These
explanations were the more to be respected, as they had not only been proposed by Congress,
but ratified by nearly three-fourths of the states. He read several of the articles proposed, re-
marking particularly on the 1 1th. and 12th. [our Ninth and Tenth Amendments] the former,
as guarding against a latitude of interpretation-the latter, as excluding every source of pow-
er not within the constitution itself.34
Madison concluded his argument by insisting that the purpose of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments was to secure the retained rights of the peo-
ple and their governments in the several states:
30 See, e.g., Memorandum from Roger Sherman to James Madison (Feb. 4, 1791), reprinted in 13
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981) (questioning
Madison's approach and asking whether the debate about the National Bank involved "a question of
expediency rather than of rights?" (emphasis added)).
31 See id.
32 See Madison, supra note 25, at 488-89 ("[T]he powers not given [to Congress] were retained
[by the states]; and . .. those given were not to be extend by remote implications.").
3 See, e.g., James Iredell, Proposed Amendment, North Carolina Ratifying Convention (Aug. 1,
1788), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 403 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
34 Madison, supra note 25, at 489 (emphasis added).
[VOL. 19:4878
2012] FEDERALISM, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
In fine, if the power were in the constitution, the immediate exercise of it cannot be essen-
tial-if not there, the exercise of it involves the guilt of usurpation, and establishes a prece-
dent of interpretation, levelling [sic] all the barriers which limit the powers of the general
government, and protect those ofthe state governments. 35
Today, we think of retained rights as involving matters of individual
rights, for example those listed in the first eight amendments to the Consti-
tution and, perhaps, those implied by the Ninth Amendment and its refer-
ence to "other[] [rights] retained by the people.""6 Matters left to the states
are generally thought of as matter of "reserved powers" protected (if at all)
by the Tenth Amendment. Rights belong to individuals (people), while
powers are viewed as belonging to institutions of government (states)."
There is a tendency, in other words, to distinguish the "retained rights of the
people" from the "reserved powers of the states," thus driving an analytical
wedge between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and between the Tenth
Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights.
This division between retained rights of the people and the reserved
powers of the states is facially denied by the document itself. It may seem
an obvious point, but an important one nonetheless, to point out that the
Tenth Amendment is part of the Bill of Rights. But even if we just focus on
the Tenth Amendment, it is impossible to create a rule of construction
where "rights go to people," but "powers go to governments." The Tenth
Amendment, after all, declares that all powers neither granted to the federal
government nor denied to the states are "reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."' For more than two hundred years, scholars have under-
stood this Amendment as leaving all nondelegated, nondenied powers to the
people of the several states, who were then free to delegate them to their
own state governments or to place such powers beyond the reach of their
own government by listing them in a state bill of rights.39 The "people," as
the term is used in the Tenth Amendment, is a reference to the collective
people in the several states who reserve the majoritarian right to participate
in acts of self government in all matters not delegated away (for example,
the right of state-level majorities to vote on matters of public education).'
These are the same collective "people" Madison spoke of in Federalist
No. 39, where he explained that the sovereign people of the several states
3 Id. at 489-90.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
3 See Seth Rokosky, Comment, Denied and Disparaged: Applying the "Federalist" Ninth
Amendment, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 275, 295-97 (2010) (discussing scholarly support for the individual
rights theory of the Ninth Amendment).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
39 See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
752-53 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
40 See Rokosky, supra note 37, at 307.
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would continue to enjoy independent existence even after the adoption of
the Constitution. 4' According to Madison:
[I]t appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification
of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other,
that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one
entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively
belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme
authority in each State-the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establish-
ing the Constitution will not be a national but a federal act.42
Once we see how the collective people in the states may both delegate
and reserve powers, it is easier to see why Madison believed the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments worked together to protect the retained rights of the
people to local self government. The Ninth Amendment declares that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people."4 3 The rights listed in the
first eight amendments act as constraints on the exercise of national power.
So another way of thinking about the Ninth Amendment is that it declares
that the constraints on national power listed in the Constitution are not the
only constraints on the exercise of federal power. This ensured that the ad-
dition of a Bill of Rights would not be construed as allowing the federal
government to regulate anything and everything so long as they avoided
abridging a particular enumerated right. State ratifying conventions would
have overwhelmingly rejected such an implied grant of national police
power, which was typically viewed as belonging to local state governments.
The Constitution avoids such an implied grant of unlimited power through
the textual device of enumerated powers, whereby all powers are withheld
except those specifically granted (or necessary and proper to their opera-
tion).' Although the state conventions insisted on the addition of a list of
enumerated rights,45 the Ninth Amendment ensures that the addition of such
a list cannot be read as altering the fundamental principle of limited enu-
merated power.
In this way, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments inevitably work togeth-
er as twin guardians of the people's retained right to local self government.
The Ninth Amendment declares that the people have retained sovereign
control over more matters than just those expressly listed in the Constitu-
41 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 239 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
42 Id
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4 See id. amend. X; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause).
45 See, e.g., Michael Lienesch, North Carolina: Preserving Rights, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION 343, 364-65 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989) (discussing North
Carolina's ratification convention).
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tion-the people have not created a government of general police power.'
If this Amendment is to have any meaning at all, it means that there are
certain powers beyond the reach of the national government, even in cases
where the exercise of such power would not abridge a specifically enumer-
ated right. Under the language of the Ninth Amendment, the people re-
tained these additional constraints on national power as a matter of right.
Under the Tenth Amendment, all such remnant, nondelegated powers
are reserved "to the States respectively, or to the people."47 As much as
scholars and courts often fail to notice the fact, the "people" of the Ninth
Amendment are obviously the same "people" of the Tenth. Both are refer-
ences to the people in the several states and their retained sovereign powers
and rights. Put another way, both Amendments declare principles of feder-
alism, whereby national power must not be so broadly construed as to grant
federal power over everything except specifically enumerated rights, and
the people in the states are protected in their sovereign right to local self
government as it relates to all matters not assigned into the hands of the
federal government. As Madison put it in his 1791 speech, the Ninth
Amendment prevented "a latitude of interpretation" of federal power while
the Tenth "exclud[ed] every source of power not within the constitution
itself."48 If the text were not clear enough, the historical testimony is clear
and unequivocal: every court and legal commentator who discussed the
Ninth Amendment in the first one hundred years of the Constitution did so
in a manner that either linked the Ninth and Tenth Amendments or de-
scribed the Ninth as a guardian of the retained rights of local self govern-
ment.49 As St. George Tucker wrote in his 1803 treatise, A View of the Con-
stitution of the United States, when the Ninth and Tenth Amendment are
combined:
The sum appears to be, that the powers delegated to the federal government, are, in all
cases, to receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the rights of
a state or of the people, either collectively, or individually, may be drawn in question.50
What seems most jarring to our ears today is the characterization of re-
served powers as one of the retained rights of the people. Under the Ameri-
can constitutional tradition of judicial review, to speak of rights is to speak
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4 Id. amend. X (emphasis added).
48 Madison, supra note 25, at 489; see also James Madison, Veto Message to Congress (Mar. 3,
1817), reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 718, 720 ("[Sleeing that such a power
is not expressly given by the Constitution, and believing that it can not [sic] be deduced from any part of
it without an inadmissible latitude of construction . . . .").
49 For an exhaustive discussion of the historical materials, see generally KURT T. LASH, THE LOST
HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2009).
50 Tucker, supra note 3, at 154.
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of an engaged judiciary actively policing and protecting such rights. One
might think that individual rights require such active judicial policing, but
not the rights of local self government. These so-called "states' rights"
might be thought of as best protected by the political process, with states
adequately protected through the mechanisms of political representation in
the national government. Of course, one can also think of individual rights
as adequately protected by the same process, and many Western-style de-
mocracies do exactly that. Under the American constitutional tradition,
however, we assume that political players are subject to incentives and
pressures that may deviate from both the true interests of the people and the
constraints on government power laid out in the text of the Constitution."
This being the case, preserving the sovereign rights of the people requires
an institution of government relatively immune from such pressures in or-
der to best preserve and protect the people's rights, including their right to
local self government if they so desire.
Judicial deference in matters relating to the proper construction of na-
tional power thus both undermines the principle of popular sovereignty and
betrays the originally understood purpose of the federal courts. It is precise-
ly for this reason that James Madison objected to Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland2 upholding the Second Bank of
the United States. In his opinion, Marshall had implied that the people of
the United States existed only in a unitary form, but not in their sovereign
capacity within the individual states.53 This meant that the people in the
states retained no rights that Marshall was obligated to protect. In his De-
tached Memoranda, Madison dismissed Marshall's "erroneous views" of
the people and congressional power.' In particular, Madison rejected the
Chief Justice's assertion about "the people" ratifying the Constitution, "if
[by this he] meant people collectively & not by States."" This fundamental
error had led to Marshall "expounding power of Cong[res]s-as if no other
Sovereignty existed in the States supplemental to the enumerated powers of
Cong[res]s.""
51 See LASH, supra note 49, at 34849.
52 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
53 Id. at 402-03.
54 James Madison, Detached Memoranda, reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note
25, at 745, 754-56.
5 Id. at 756.
56 Id Marshall had also implied that Madison, when President, had changed his mind about the
constitutionality of the Bank as evidenced by his signing the Bill creating the Second Bank of the United
States. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 402 ("The original act was permitted to expire; but a short experience
of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the government, convinced those who
were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the present law.").
Madison insisted, however, that he had merely acquiesced to longstanding precedent, and he took um-
brage at Marshall's implying otherwise. See Madison, supra note 54, at 756 (noting that Marshall was
wrong to "imput[e] concurrence of those formerly opposed to change of opinion, instead of precedents
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II. JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
The link between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as twin guardians
of the retained right to local self government highlights how federalism
stands as one of the rights of the people of the United States, one which
courts of law have a duty to protect. In his speech before the House of Rep-
resentatives, Madison explained that, by adding a Bill of Rights, "inde-
pendent tribunals of justice will consider themselves . . . the guardians of
those rights" and would "resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights."" Here, Madi-
son simply repeated what had already been promised to the state ratifying
conventions as they considered whether to adopt the original Constitution.
In Federalist No. 44, Madison explained that the judiciary would serve
as one of a number of institutional checks on unduly expansive exercises of
federal power:
If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall misconstrue this part
of the Constitution and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning, I answer the same
as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general
power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated; the same, in
short, as if the State legislatures should violate their respective constitutional authorities. In
the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary
departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts . . . .8
Although today we think of judicial enforcement of individual rights
as pertaining only to individual rights, this was not the case at the time of
the founding. Madison expressly assured the states during the ratification
debates that any undue extension of federal law amounted to an intrusion
into the retained rights of the States." In fact, Madison insisted throughout
his life that the courts must remain engaged in the effort to secure these
rights by maintaining the line of division between state and federal power.'
superseding opinion"). For a discussion of Madison's view of precedent and proper constitutional inter-
pretation, see generally Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007).
57 James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments, reprinted in
JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 449.
58 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 41, at 282 (James Madison).
59 Id. ("The truth is that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional
acts of the federal than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason that as every such act of the former
will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound
the alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representa-
tives.").
6 See, e.g., James Madison, To Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS, supra note 25, at 733, 734 (criticizing Marshall's opinion in McCulloch as relinquishing "all
controul on the Legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers").
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III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Nor did the nation abandon the concept of federalism as liberty at the
time of Reconstruction and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although today we tend to associate the Union victory over the slavehold-
ing South as a victory of nationalism over states'-rights federalism,' the
reality is far more complicated. It was the slaveholding states that initially
rejected the concept of states' rights and sought to impose chattel slavery as
a national right, which would have allowed them to carry slaves into every
state in the Union.62 The infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford63 decision was a
step in the direction of nationwide slavery. Indeed, the unduly broad, and
distinctly nationalist, interpretations of national power in cases like Dred
Scott and Prigg v. Pennsylvania"4 threatened to snuff out the few jurisdic-
tions where the people exercised their rights of local self government and
rejected slavery.
Article 4 of the 1860 Platform specifically addressed Republican fidel-
ity to the original dualist structure of the federal Constitution:
That the maintenance, inviolate, of the Rights of the States, and especially the rights of each
State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclu-
sively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our po-
litical fabric depends 65
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the moderate Republicans who con-
trolled the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment believed they were re-
storing the proper balance of state and federal power-a balance violently
61 See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 872-73 (1986).
62 See Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution, 36 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 467, 471 (1992).
63 60 U.S.(19 How.) 393 (1857).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
65 National Republican Platform, Adopted by the Chicago Convention (May 17, 1860), reprinted
in 2 THE AMERICAN PARTY BATTLE: ELECTION CAMPAIGN PAMPHLETS, 1828-1876, at 121, 122 (Joel
H. Silbey ed., 1999); see also EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE CONGRESS,
1863-1869, at 30 (1990) (noting that the task of Reconstruction "was further complicated by the Repub-
licans' firm attachment to the basic structure of federalism"); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 114 (1988) ("Most Republican supporters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment, like the Dem-
ocrat opponents, feared centralized power and did not want to see state and local power substantially
curtailed."). The Republican Party's national platform in 1860 insisted that "the Federal Constitution,
the Rights of the States, and the Union of the States, must and shall be preserved." National Republican
Platform, supra, at 121. According to Michael Les Benedict, "most Republicans [during Reconstruction]
never desired a broad, permanent extension of national legislative power." Michael Les Benedict, Pre-
serving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65, 67
(1974).
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skewed by the slave power.' It is no surprise then that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment, even as they sought to enshrine new rights against
state action, remained committed to preserving both federalism and local
control over all matters not expressly delegated into the hands of the na-
tional government. According to Representative John Bingham of Ohio, the
man who framed Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Sir, I have always so learned our dual system of Government by which our own American
nationality and liberty have been established and maintained. I have always believed that the
protection in time of peace within the States of all the rights of person and citizen was of the
powers reserved to the States. And so I still believe.67
As much as the Fourteenth Amendment imposed new and important
constraints on the states' authority to interfere with constitutionally protect-
ed rights, nothing in that Amendment, or in the intentions of the man who
framed it, alters the fundamental principle that the people retain the rights
of local self government in all matters not expressly denied to the states
somewhere in the text of the federal Constitution.
CONCLUSION
In cases like United States v. Lopez6 8 and United States v. Morrison,'
the Supreme Court has attempted to draw a line between federal and state
authority. In those cases, the division involved a distinction between local
commercial and local noncommercial activity. As was the case for the Su-
preme Court's earlier distinction between direct and indirect impacts on
interstate commerce,'o the commercial/noncommercial distinction has been
criticized as an unrealistic attempt to determine where effects on interstate
commerce begin and end." In many ways, however, this argument misses
the point of making the distinction in the first place. We need not draw a
line between local and national matters to conform to a theory of economics
or social utility. As with all lines drawn in the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence of individual rights, these distinctions are constructed in order to se-
cure an area of local autonomy over matters never delegated into the hands
of the federal government. Preserving the right to local self government is
one of the retained rights of the people, one as deserving of active judicial
6 See Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham
and the Second Draft ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 345-46 (2011).
67 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1293 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
68 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
69 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
70 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-47 (1935).
71 See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 564 (1995).
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protection as any other constitutionally secured right. Justice Kennedy rec-
ognized as much in Bond v. United States. Here's hoping the Court will
follow Kennedy's lead when there is more at stake than the mere recogni-
tion of party standing.
